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CORRUPTION IN MAURITIUS
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ABSTRACT
There is a close relationship between democracy and corruption.  Corruption
has a negative effect on the functioning of political and democratic
institutions.  It affects the delivery of services such as education and
healthcare.  In order to consolidate democracy, Mauritius has adopted
different measures to prevent and combat corruption.  These have included
the ratification of international treaties such as the United Nations (UN)
Convention against Corruption, the signing of the African Union Convention
on Preventing and Combating Corruption and the enactment of domestic law,
Prevention of Corruption Act, which criminalises different corrupt activities. 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the jurisprudence that has emerged
from courts in Mauritius interpreting and applying the different sections of the
Prevention of Corruption Act and to recommend ways through which the Act
could be amended or interpreted to strengthen the fight against corruption.
I.  INTRODUCTION
There is a close relationship between democracy and corruption.1  Corruption has a
negative effect on the functioning of political and democratic institutions.2  It affects the
delivery of services such as education and healthcare.3  In order to consolidate
democracy, Mauritius has adopted different measures to prevent and combat corruption.
These have included the ratification of international treaties such as the UN Convention
against Corruption (in December 2004), the signing of the African Union Convention
*   Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape.  Email:
<djmujuzi@gmail.com>.
1.  M.T. Rock, Corruption and Democracy (2007) DESA Working Paper No. 55,
ST/ESA/2007/DWP/55. Available at <http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp55_2007.pdf>,
(accessed 01 September 2015).
2.  D.D. Porta and Y. Mény, Introduction: Democracy and Corruption, in DEMOCRACY AND
CORRUPTION IN EUROPE (D.D. Porta & Y. Mény, 1997), at 1 – 2.
3.  S. Gupta, H.R. Davoodi and E. Tiongson, Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and
Education Services (2000) IMF Working Paper,  WP/00/116,  avai lable  a t
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00116.pdf>, (accessed 01 September 2015).
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on Preventing and Combating Corruption (in July 2004) and the enactment of domestic
law which criminalizes different corrupt activities.  
In April 2002, the Prevention of Corruption Act4 (POCA) came into force.  Its
long title is to the effect that the aims of the Act are ‘[t]o provide for the prevention and
punishment of corruption and fraud and for the establishment of an Independent
Commission Against Corruption.’  Since the coming into force of the Act, courts have
handed down several judgments dealing with its various sections.  The Supreme Court
of Mauritius has held that Mauritius has an international obligation to combat
transnational crimes.5  However, the Supreme Court has also warned:
That the country has to improve its national and international image in
the corruption perception index, of that there can be no doubt. 
However, it should not in the process impair its national and
international image on the human rights perception index.  The two
indexes are not mutually exclusive.6
The purpose of this article is to discuss the jurisprudence that has emerged from courts
in Mauritius interpreting and applying the different sections of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and to recommend ways through which the Act could be amended or
interpreted to strengthen the fight against corruption.  This article deals with the
following issues: the application of the Act, offences under the Act and how they have
been interpreted by courts, reporting, investigating and prosecuting corruption, some
of the challenges faced in prosecuting corruption and the sentences imposed for the
offenders.  The author will start by highlighting cases in which courts have dealt with
the issue of the application of the Act.
II.  APPLICATION OF THE ACT
Section 3 of the Act provides that: ‘A person shall commit an offence under this Act
where— (a) the act or omission constituting the offence occurs in Mauritius or outside
Mauritius; or (b) the act constituting the offence is done by that person, or for him, by
4.  Prevention of Corruption Act 2002, Act 5/2002, Proclaimed by [Proclamation No. 18 of 2002]
w. e. f 1st April 2002.
5.  The Independent Commission against Corruption 2005 SCJ 72 in which the Court emphasised
Mauritius’ obligation under the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime to
fight organised crime.
6.  Manraj & Ors v. ICAC 2003 SCJ 75; 2003 MR 41, at 24.
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another person.’  Section 3(a) thus makes it very clear the Act is applicable to corrupt
activities committed in Mauritius and outside Mauritius.  In simple terms, it has
territorial and extra-territorial application.  Before 2006, section 3(a) provided that ‘[a]
person shall commit an offence under this Act where - (a) the act or omission
constituting the offence occurs outside Mauritius.’
In 2006, section 3(a) was amended to provide expressly that it was applicable
to offences committed in Mauritius.  Courts had to deal with the issue of whether
section 3(a) before it was amended in 2006 was applicable to offences committed in
Mauritius.  For example, in Independent Commission Against Corruption v.
Peermamode M.R.A.F.E. and The Director Of Public Prosecutions v. Peermamode
M.R.A.F.E,7 the accused were prosecuted under section 10(4) of POCA and the issue
on appeal was whether ‘the legislator had created a valid criminal offence in respect of
which the accused could be convicted for the offences alleged to have been committed
within Mauritius’ before POCA was amended in 2006.  The Supreme Court referred to
the drafting history of POCA and that of the 2006 amendment Act and to various rules
of statutory interpretation to hold that the offence of which the accused were prosecuted
were known in Mauritian law before the 2006 amendment.
In Joomeer N v. State8 in which the Supreme Court also dealt with the question
of whether section 3 was applicable to offences committed in Mauritius, it was held
that:
If domestic jurisdiction was to be excluded, it could not have been
done without express provisions such as: “This Act shall not apply to
acts and omissions occurring in Mauritius.” There was in fact no need
for the legislature to amend section 3.  A proper interpretation of
section 3 in its 2002 version meant that where the act or omission
constituting the offence occurs elsewhere than in Mauritius, the author
shall commit an offence under the Act.  There is no exclusion of
territorial jurisdiction.  This is what the clarification which the
amendment of 2006 sought to bring.9
7.  Independent Commission against Corruption v. Peermamode M.R.A.F.E.; and The Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Peermamode M.R.A.F.E. 2012 SCJ 104.  See also, ICAC v. Ng Sui Wa 2012 INT
148; ICAC v. Satyawan Kutwaroo & Iswaraj Ghallu 2010 INT 61; ICAC v. Suresh Mahadeo 2010 INT
257; ICAC v. Ng Sui Wa Christophe 2012 INT 74; Noormamode v. ICAC & Anor 2015 SCJ 93.
8.  Joomeer v. State 2013 SCJ 413.
9.  Id., para 33.
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Another issue that courts have had to deal with is whether POCA is applicable to
offences that were committed before it was enacted.  In Somauroo & Ors v.
Independent Commission against Corruption,10 the applicants argued, inter alia, that ‘in
the absence of retrospective and retroactive provisions, the respondent is precluded
from enquiring and investigating into alleged offences [in this case money laundering]
which might have been committed before the coming into operation of’ POCA.11
In dismissing the applicants’ application, the Supreme Court held that section
90 of POCA empowered the police to investigate offences that were committed before
POCA was enacted.  The full bench of the Supreme Court held that ‘the principle of
non-retroactivity of criminal law…is in no way infringed by the investigation of facts
prior to the enactment creating a specific offence so long as those facts tend to establish
the commission of the offence not prior to the enactment but subsequent to the
enactment.’12  Therefore, in the light of those judgements, the questions of whether it
is applicable to offences committed in Mauritius or to offences committed before it was
enacted, have now been settled.
A.  Offences under the Act
As mentioned earlier, the Act criminalizes several corrupt activities.  These include:
bribery by public official; bribery of public official; taking gratification to screen
offender from punishment; public official using his office for gratification; bribery of
or by a public official to influence the decision of a public body; influencing public
official; “trafic d'influence”; public official taking gratification; bribery for procuring
contracts; conflict of interests; treating of public official; receiving gift for a corrupt
purpose; corruption of agent; and corruption to provoke a serious offence.  The author
deals with the jurisprudence in which courts in Mauritius have interpreted the elements
of some of the offences and the evidence that has to be adduced to prove that an
offender committed an offence in question.  Most of the offences refer to a ‘public
official.’  It is imperative to first have a look at the definition of a public official and
how a person’s status as a public official has been or may be proved in court.
1.  Public official—Section 2 of the Act defines a public official in the
following terms:
(a) means a Minister, a member of the National Assembly, a public officer, a local
10.  Somauroo & Ors v. Independent Commission against Corruption 2008 SCJ 307.
11.  Id., at 2.
12.  ICAC v. Somauroo & Ors 2011 SCJ 299, at 4.
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government officer, an employee or member of a local authority, a member of a
Commission set up under the Constitution, an employee or member of a statutory
corporation, or an employee or director of any Government company; (b) includes a
Judge, an arbitrator, an assessor or a member of a jury; (c) includes an official of the
International Criminal Court referred to in the International Criminal Court Act 2011. 
Case law shows that courts have relied on different sources to conclude that a
person is a public official.  These have included the fact the accused is a senior
employee of a local government,13 is a manager of a government corporation,14 is the
chairperson of the committee of a statutory body,15 has admitted that he is a public
official, for example, and that he is a police official.16  The circumstances of the case
have led to the court’s conclusion that there is no dispute that a witness17 or the
accused18 is a public official because he or she was a cabinet minister (the accused);19
a police official;20 an employed official at the Ministry of Training Skills, Development
and Productivity;21 or a road traffic inspector.22
In some cases, evidence has been led to prove that the accused is a public
official.  These have included cases where the accused is an agricultural machinery
operator at the Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool Corporation;23 the prosecution
13.  Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Sicharam 2008 INT 436 (the complainant
was the head of the Planning Department at one district council).
14.  ICAC v. Soobrah 2013 INT 311, at 9.
15.  ICAC v. Bidianand Jhurry 2010 INT 145 (the accused was the Chairman of the Sugar
Industry Labour Welfare Fund Committee).
16.  Police v. Rambans Salick & Anor 2008 INT 239, at 5.
17.  Police v. Parmanand Bundhoo 2012 INT 80 (the court held that there was no dispute that
the witness, whom the accused was attempting to bribe, was a police officer and therefore a public
official).  In ICAC v. Roussety, the Court held that ‘It is not disputed that the complainant was a public
official, being the Island Chief Executive of Rodrigues.’  See ICAC v. Roussety 2012 INT 199, at 8.
18.  Police v. Joymungul Ambar Kumar 2010 INT 12 (the court observed that it was not seriously
disputed that the accused was a public official); ICAC v. Jacques Roger Rousseau and Ors 2014 INT 315,
at 2.
19.  Police v. Jugnauth Pravind Kumar 2011 PL3 213.
20.  Police v. Kiran Kumar Burhoo 2010 INT 263; Police v. Venkatakistnen Rangasananda 2009
INT 91; Police v. Soobarao Rama 2009 INT 152; ICAC v. Dowlut Imtiaz Khan 2011 INT 84; ICAC v.
Gowry Suraj 2013 INT 1; ICAC v. Lutchmeenaraidoo Harishchandrah 2009 INT 266.
21.  Police v. Veeria Hasokumar 2009 INT 177.
22.  ICAC v. Seedeer 2012 INT 92.
23.  In Police v. Ramchurn Shri Krishnaduth Jee, the Court observed that ‘it is not disputed that
the accused was a public official within section 2 of the POCA.  Witness Mungroo [Field Manager at
SPMPC] confirmed that the accused was at the material time employed as Agricultural Machinery
Operator by the SPMPC, no doubt a Statutory Corporation , governed by the Sugar Planters Mechanical
Pool Corporation Act 1974.’  See Police v. Ramchurn Shri Krishnaduth Jee 2012 INT 114, at 3.
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producing a document or adducing evidence to show the accused’s official status as a
police officer;24 a witness25 or the prosecution26 producing a letter from the
Commissioner of Police to prove that the accused was a police officer or employed by
the Road Development Agency.27
However, in some cases courts do not mention that the accused is a public
official and the basis for that conclusion.  This could be attributed to the fact that courts
take judicial notice, without expressly stating so, that a police officer,28 a probation
officer29 or land surveyor,30 are public officials.  A police officer will be prosecuted as
a public official even if the gratification was solicited when he was off duty.31 
2.  Bribery by public official—Section 4 of the Act provides that:
(1) Any public official who solicits, accepts or obtains from another person, for himself
or for any other person, a gratification for - (a) doing or abstaining from doing, or
having done or abstained from doing, an act in the execution of his functions or duties;
(b) doing or abstaining from doing, or having done or abstained from doing, an act
which is facilitated by his functions or duties; (c) expediting, delaying, hindering or
preventing, or having expedited, delayed, hindered or prevented, the performance of an
act in the execution of his functions or duties; (d) expediting, delaying, hindering or
preventing, or having expedited, delayed, hindered or prevented, the performance of an
act by another public official, in the execution of the latter's functions or duties; (e)
assisting, favouring, hindering or delaying, or having assisted, favoured, hindered or
delayed, another person in the transaction of a business with a public body, shall
commit an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to penal servitude for a term not
exceeding 10 years.
(2) Notwithstanding section 83, where in any proceedings against any person for an
offence, it is proved that the public official solicited, accepted or obtained a
gratification, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the gratification was
solicited, accepted or obtained for any of the purposes set out in subsection (1)(a) to (e).
24.  ICAC v. Baboolall 2012 INT 77, at 2; ICAC v. Seeruttun Leckram 2009 INT 200.
25.  ICAC v. Gerard Phillippe Rayepa 2011 INT 142, at 1.
26.  ICAC v. Hamtohul Balakrishna 2008 INT 46, at 6; ICAC v. Cangy 2013 INT 287, at 2;
Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Chinnarassen 2012 INT 229, at 1;
27.  ICAC v. Mohess 2011 INT 14, at 2 and 7.
28.  See for example, ICAC v. Doyal 2013 INT 62; ICAC v. Soobrun Shivanand 2006 INT 427;
Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Curpen Murday 2013 INT 299.
29.  ICAC v. Pursoty 2013 INT 134.
30.  Police v. Ghunowa Shalendrea 2009 INT 51.
31.  ICAC v. Seeruttun Leckram 2009 INT 200.
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In Hanumunthadu Rajen v. The State & Anor,32 in which the appellant, a town
engineer, was convicted of soliciting a bribe from one of the contractors in order to
certify and process a claim for the work the contractor had done, the Supreme Court
held that:
[I]n order to establish its case on a charge under section 4(1) of the
POCA, what the prosecution had to establish, was that the appellant
being a public official did solicit from the complainant a gratification
for doing an act in the execution of his functions.  It had to establish
that the solicitation of the gratification was in relation to an act which
falls within the execution of the officer’s functions and that processing
and certification of claims averred in the information formed part of
the duties of the appellant.  It was however not an element of the
offence and it was not necessary for the prosecution to establish that
the appellant had indeed processed or certified the claims. 
Indeed…section 4(1)(a) creates a distinct offence of a public official
soliciting a gratification for having done an act in the execution of his
duties. It is under that offence that it becomes necessary for the
prosecution to prove that the act in respect of which the gratification
was solicited, was in fact carried out by the public official.33
The Court appears to be of the view that section 4(1) creates an offence distinct from
those under subsections (1)(a) – (1)(e).  This reasoning is further supported by the
Court’s holding that ‘[a]n offence under section 4(1) of the POCA is committed the
moment that the solicitation is made…’34  In the author’s opinion, that holding is
debatable.  This is because section 4(1) contains words that are meant to apply to all the
paragraphs that follow it as each paragraph creates distinct offences.  For the accused
to be convicted under section 4(1)(a), the prosecution must prove, inter alia, the purpose
for which the gratification was allegedly sought otherwise the accused will be
acquitted.35  If the prosecution alleges that the accused received a gratification for
himself but the person who gave the said gratification testifies in evidence that he gave
it to the accused for the accused to give it to another person, the accused will be
32.  Hanumunthadu Rajen v. The State & Anor 2010 SCJ 288.
33.  Id., at 5.
34.  Id., at 16.
35.  Curpen v. Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor 2015 SCJ 66, at 3; ICAC
v. Doyal, supra note 28, at 2.
2015]                                         Strengthening Democracy in Mauritius                                               289
acquitted.36
In Suneechara v. The State,37 the Supreme Court held ‘that section 4(1)(a) sets
down a number of permutations and possible ways whereby the offence of bribery by
a public official can be committed.’38  For a public official to be convicted under section
4(1)(a) for obtaining a gratification for ‘doing…an act in the execution of his functions
or duties’ the prosecution must prove that the act he did was in the execution of his
duties.39
In Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Seeneevassen,40 the accused,
a police official, was prosecuted under section 4(1)(b) because he, inter alia, collected,
for his colleague’s business, an outstanding debt.  The Supreme Court in acquitting him
held that ‘paying a debt to CIM cannot form part of the duties of a police officer; nor
can it be an act done by a police officer in the execution of his duties.’41  For the
accused to be convicted of soliciting a gratification for ‘himself’, the prosecution does
not have to prove that the gratification was indeed for the accused.  The court can infer
from the circumstances of the case to conclude that ‘the money would have been for the
accused himself.’42
A person prosecuted for soliciting a gratification under section 4(1)(a) will be
convicted even if he does not accept the money from the person from whom he solicited
it because ‘the charge is one of soliciting and not of accepting a gratification.’43  This
is because ‘If ever there was no solicitation whatsoever, one would have expected the
accused to report the complainant for offering bribe.’44  For a person to be convicted of
soliciting a gratification, the prosecution must prove that the words he used indeed
meant that he was soliciting a bribe.  A court will not take judicial notice of the fact that
some words mean that the person is soliciting a bribe.45  For a person to be convicted
under section 4(1)(b) the prosecution must prove, inter alia, that the solicitation of the
36.  ICAC v. Doyal, id., at 5.
37.  Suneechara v. The State 2007 SCJ 131.
38.  Id., at 16.
39.  ICAC v. Soobrun Shivanand, supra note 28.  See also, ICAC v. Soobrun 2007 SCJ 318 in
which the Supreme Court did not question the holding that for a person to be convicted he must have
obtained the gratification in the execution of his duties.
40.  Independent Commission against Corruption v. Seeneevassen 2012 SCJ 328.
41.  Id., at 7.
42.  Independent Commission against Corruption v. Chinnarassen 2012 INT 229, at 7.
43.  Independent Commission against Corruption v. Curpen Murday 2013 INT 299, at 9. 
Emphasis in original.
44.  Id., at 9.  The accused, suspecting that he had been trapped by ICAC officials, refused to
accept money from the witness although he attempted several times to give it to him.
45.  ICAC v. Dowlut Imtiaz Khan 2011 INT 84, at 3.
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gratification was in ‘relation to an act which was facilitated by the accused’s functions
[or duties].’46  In ICAC v. Gowry Suraj,47 the accused, a police official, was convicted
under section 4(1)(b) of accepting an offer of money to facilitate an offender’s escape
from lawful custody.  Where the accused, a police officer, fined the witnesses for
contravening traffic rules, the prosecution could not argue that he had ‘solicited from
another person, for himself, a gratification for abstaining from doing an act in the
execution of his duties.’48
Another issue relates to the burden that is imposed on the accused under section
4(2).  Is it a burden of proof, in that the accused must prove his innocence if he is to
escape a conviction, or it is an evidential burden.  In Suneechara v. The State,49 one of
the issues that the Supreme Court dealt with was whether section 4(2) of POCA ‘is
compliant…with the presumption of innocence [under section 10 of the Constitution]
which places an onus upon the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offence with
which an accused is charged.’50 Relying on the relevant jurisprudence from England and
Mauritius on the presumption of innocence, the Court observed that ‘[t]he presumption
of innocence has long been a governing principle of criminal law’ and that ‘[i]t is
nothing new in our concept of criminal law and section 10(2)(a) of our Constitution but
affirms that principle.’51  The Court added that ‘[b]ut that principle though regarded as
supremely important was stated [in a 1935 English court decision] not to be absolute.’52 
The Court referred to several cases from England on the issue of the presumption of
innocence53 and held that:
There is no doubt that the underlying rationale of the presumption of
innocence is a simple one: that it is repugnant to ordinary norms of
fairness for the prosecution to accuse a defendant of crime and for the
latter to be then required to disprove the accusation on pain of
conviction and punishment if he fails to do so.  However, any
sovereign state has the full powers to legislate and to define the
constituent elements of an offence.  It may, under certain conditions,
penalise a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of whether it
46.  ICAC v. Suresh Mahadeo, supra note 7, at 13.
47.  ICAC v. Gowry Suraj, supra note 20.
48.  ICAC v. Cangy 2013 INT 287.
49.  Suneechara v. The State, supra note 37.
50.  Id., at 26.
51.  Id.
52.  Id.
53.  Id., at 27.
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results from criminal intent or from negligence.  Indeed presumptions
of fact or of law operate in every legal system and our Constitution
does not prohibit such presumptions in principle.  However, the State
must remain within certain limits in this respect as regards Criminal
law.  Otherwise, the legislature would be free to strip the trial Court of
any effective power of assessment and deprive the presumption of
innocence of its substance.  A balancing exercise must be carried out
and section 10(2) of the Constitution would require the legislature to
confine itself within reasonable limits which take into account the
importance of what is at stake while maintaining the rights of the
defence.  The question in any case must be whether, on the facts, the
reasonable limits to which a presumption must be subjected have been
exceeded.54
The Court then referred to jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights and
the European Commission of Human Rights on the issue of reasonableness55 and held
that ‘section 4(2) of the POCA does not infringe the principle of fair trial and more
specially [sic] that of presumption of innocence enshrined in section 10(2) of the
Constitution.’56  The Court seems to be of the view that the offender’s right to be
presumed innocent is not absolute and that there are certain circumstances under which
he had to challenge the prosecution’s case if he is to escape a conviction.  It is argued
that this holding threatens the accused’s right to remain silent at his trial.  The author
is of the view that the preferred approach is not to interpret the presumption under
section 4(2) as imposing a burden of proof on the accused, however exceptional the
circumstances may be, but rather to interpret it as an evidential burden.  The latter
approach was taken by the Supreme Court in a later decision.  In Hanumunthadu Rajen
v. The State & Anor,57 the Court also referred to section 4(2) and held that:
[T]he prosecution had established…that the appellant had solicited the
gratification, there was accordingly a presumption that this
gratification was solicited for one of the purposes set out in the
subsection which in this case is under sub section (1)(a), namely, for
54.  Id., at 28.
55.  Id., at 29 – 30.
56.  Id., at 30.  See also, Parayag v. The Independent Commission against Corruption 2011 SCJ
309, at 16.
57.  Hanumunthadu case, supra note 32.
292                                   East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights                               [Vol 21:2
performing an act in the execution of his functions, and which is
particularised in the information as being the processing of the claims
of the respondent.  There was thereafter an evidential burden upon the
appellant to prove the contrary and on the evidence, he has clearly
failed to discharge this burden.58
The Supreme Court thus makes it very clear that the burden imposed on the accused
under section 4(2) is an evidential burden.  It is not a burden of proof.  He does not have
to prove his innocence.  For the accused to escape a conviction, the burden imposed on
him has to be discharged on a balance of probabilities.59  Section 4 criminalises a wide
range of activities and many public officials have been prosecuted and convicted in
terms of this section for conduct such as soliciting for a bribe so as not to fine a person
driving a vehicle without a valid licence,60 soliciting for a bribe on behalf of his
superior,61 and soliciting a bribe for himself and for another police official so as not to
fine the complainant for driving a vehicle without a licence.62
3.  Bribery of a public official—Section 5 provides that:
(1) Any person who gives, agrees to give, or offers a gratification to a public official
for—(a) doing, or for abstaining from doing, or having done or abstained from doing,
an act in the execution of his functions or duties; (b) doing or abstaining from doing,
or for having done or abstained from doing, an act which is facilitated by his functions
or duties; (c) expediting, delaying, hindering or preventing, or having expedited,
delayed, hindered or prevented, the performance of an act in the execution of his
functions or duties; (d) expediting, delaying, hindering or preventing, or having
expedited, delayed, hindered or prevented, the performance of an act by another public
official in the execution of the latter's functions or duties; (e) assisting, favouring,
hindering or delaying or having assisted, favoured, hindered or delayed another person
in the transaction of a business with a public body, shall commit an offence and shall,
on conviction, be liable to penal servitude for a term not exceeding 10 years.
(2) Notwithstanding section 83, where in any proceedings against any person for an
offence under subsection (1) it is proved that the accused gave, agreed to give or offered
58.  Id., at 9.
59.  ICAC v. Hamtohul Balakrishna, supra note 26, at 10 (the court was referring to section 83
of POCA).  See also, Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Balluck 2009 INT 101, at 9.
60.  Police v. Rambans Salick & Anor 2008 INT 239 (this was in terms of section 4(1)(b)).
61.  Police v. Joymungul Ambar Kumar, supra note 18.
62.  Bissessur v. The State & Anor 2012 SCJ 16 (contrary to section 4(1)(b)).
2015]                                         Strengthening Democracy in Mauritius                                               293
gratification, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the accused gave,
agreed to give or offered the gratification for any of the purposes set out in subsection
(1)(a) to (e).
The person contemplated in section 5 could be a public official bribing another
public official or a person not being a public official bribing a public official.  The
prosecution must prove that the person being bribed is a public official and that the
‘accused wilfully and unlawfully offered a gratification’ to a public official.63  Both
natural and juristic persons may be prosecuted under section 5.  The challenge though
is that should a juristic person, for example, a company be convicted of an offence
under section 5, there is no penalty prescribed for it.  This rather unfortunate situation
was evident in Police v. Boskalis International bv and anor64 where the two companies
pleaded guilty and were convicted of bribing public officials.  However, the court could
not impose a sentence on them as no sentence is provided for under section 5 for
corporations.  The Court held that ‘i]n view of the impossibility to apply the sentence
provided by section 5 of the POCA to corporate bodies, the legislator may consider
taking legislative action so that there is no more the perception that corrupt corporate
bodies can get away scot-free in Mauritius.’65  
All the cases that the author is aware of have included non-public officials
attempting to bribe public officials.  For example, in Police v. Parmanand Bundhoo,66
the accused who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was convicted of offering
a gratification to a police officer to abstain from doing an alcohol test on him.  In Police
v. Mohammad Ziad Aumeer,67 the accused was convicted on his plea of guilty for
bribing a police official so as not to issue him fines for contravening a number of traffic
laws. In Police v Soobarao Rama68 the accused was convicted of bribing a police officer
so as not to fine him for dangerous driving.
4.  Public official using his office for gratification—Section 7 of the Act
provides that:
(1) Subject to subsection (3), any public official who makes use of his office or position
for a gratification for himself or another person shall commit an offence and shall, on
conviction, be liable to penal servitude for a term not exceeding 10 years.
63.  Police v. Parmanand Bundhoo 2012 INT 80, at 3.
64.  Police v. Boskalis International bv & Anor 2013 INT 288.
65.  Id., at 15.
66.  See Police v. Parmanand Bundhoo, supra note 63.
67.  Police v. Mohammad Ziad Aumeer 2014 INT 233.
68.  Police v. Soobarao Rama, supra note 20.
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(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a public official shall be presumed, until the
contrary is proved, to have made use of his office or position for a gratification where
he has taken any decision or action in relation to any matter in which he, or a relative
or associate of his, has a direct or indirect interest.
(3) This section shall not apply to a public official who - (a) holds office in a public
body as a representative of a body corporate which holds shares or interests in that
public body; and (b) acts in that capacity in the interest of that body corporate.
For a public official to be convicted of an offence under section 7, the
prosecution has to prove one or a combination of the following elements: that he made
use of his office for a gratification for himself; that he made use of his position for
gratification for another person.69  In Independent Commission Against Corruption v.
Seeneevassen70 in which a police official was accused of obtaining a gratification under
section 7, the Supreme Court, in acquitting him, held that there was ‘no evidence…that
[he] obtained the money because he was a police officer.’71  The Court added that
section 7(2) is applicable in a situation ‘where a public official uses his position, for
example, to award a contract to a company in which he and his spouse own all the
shares.’72
In ICAC v. Soobrah,73 the accused was prosecuted under section 7(1) for failure
to follow conventional practice in selling the corporation’s unserviceable assets when
he sold the said property to his work colleague and for appointing the same colleague
as an employee of the corporation without the necessary qualifications.  The court in
acquitting him held that at the time he approved the sale there were no regulations that
he should have followed and that the appointment of the employee had been approved
by the board at a later stage.  For the accused to be convicted under section 7(1), there
is no need for the prosecution to prove that he obtained a gratification.74  The Supreme
Court held that:
The opprobrium lies in the abuse or misuse of the office or the position
as a public officer for a gratification.  Whether the gratification is
69.  In addition to the above elements, the prosecution has to prove that the accused is a public
official.  See ICAC v. Tupsy 2014 INT 223, at 1.  See also, Police v. Charlot 2008 INT 440 where the
Court in acquitting the accused held, inter alia, that there was no evidence that he had solicited for a
gratification for himself.
70.  Seeneevassen case, supra note 40.
71.  Id., at 7.
72.  Id.
73.  ICAC v. Soobrah 2013 INT 311.
74.  ICAC v. Tupsy, supra note 69, at 1.
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received or accepted is not part of the elements of the offence even if
the reception or the acceptance adds further evidential weight to prove
that the abuse of office was “for gratification.”75
In Joomeer v. State,76 the Supreme Court held that:
The section that creates the offence is section 7(1) of the Act. Section
7(2) is only an evidential section.  It creates a presumption.  But the
presumption operates not in all the cases falling under the purview of
section 7(1) but only in those situations where the public official “has
taken [a] decision or action in relation to any matter in which he, or a
relative or associate of his, has a direct or indirect interest.”77
Those who have been convicted under section 7(1) have included a police official who
accepted a bribe from a driver for not reporting road traffic offences against him (he had
used his position),78 an agricultural machinery operator who used the Sugar Planters
Mechanical Pool Corporation’s tractor to plough people’s land and pocket the money,79
and the chairperson of the committee of a statutory body who used his position to
appoint his relatives to different vacant posts.80
5.  Influencing public official—Section 9 provides that:
Any person who exercises any form of violence, or pressure by means of threat, upon
a public official, with a view to the performance, by that public official, of any act in
the execution of his functions or duties, or the non-performance, by that public official,
of any such act, shall commit an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to penal
servitude for a term not exceeding 10 years.
For a person to be prosecuted in terms of section 9, he does not have to be a
public official. What matters is that he or she threatens or commits any of the prohibited
acts against a public official.  In Independent Commission against Corruption v
Sicharam,81 the accused, a councillor at the district council, used abusive language
against an official whom he though was responsible for his friends’ company’s
75.  Joomeer v. State, supra note 8, para 43.
76.  Id..
77.  Id., para 47.  Emphasis removed.
78.  Police v. Kiran Kumar Burhoo, supra note 20.
79.  Police v. Ramchurn Shri Krishnaduth Jee, supra note 23.
80.  ICAC v. Bidianand Jhurry, supra note 15.
81.  Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Sicharam, supra note 13.
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unsuccessful application for a development permit, threatened her and also verbally
harassed her during the Planning Committee meetings.  The Court held that there was
evidence that the accused threatened the complainant and he was convicted accordingly. 
The Court observed that:
I am satisfied that [the complainant] was a Public Official since she
was the Head of the Planning Department at the Black River District
Council.  I am satisfied that in that capacity she had to make
recommendations in respect of the granting of development permits,
whether the recommendations were binding or not.  I find that it was
her duty to act in a professional and in an objective manner without
interference in the execution of her duties.  Since the accused came to
her office and shouted at her…  I find that the conduct of the accused
clearly shows that the accused did exercise pressure by means of threat
upon witness…so that the latter made a favourable recommendation
to the Planning Committee in respect of the application of [the
accused’s friend’s company] for a development permit.82
Although section 9 punishes ‘any person’ including a public official who commits any
of the prohibited acts, the author is not aware of any case in which people who are not
public officials have been convicted of violating section 9.  It is also important to note
that in all cases where people have been convicted under section 9, it was a senior or
influential public official threatening a relatively junior public official.  This means that
section 9 could be an effective tool to prevent senior public officials from coercing
junior public officials to make decisions that further the former’s personal interests.
A public official who discloses confidential official documents to a corruption
investigating body for that body to investigate an allegation that he had been threatened
by another public official to perform or refrain from performing an act does not commit
an offence.83  This is because the POCA imposes a duty on public officials to report acts
of corruption and the ICAC has a duty to keep such information as confidential.84
In ICAC v. Roussety,85 the accused, the Chief Commissioner of the Rodrigues
Regional Assembly, was convicted of exercising pressure by means of a threat on the
Chief Executive of the Rodrigues Regional Assembly to set up a board, made up of
82.  Id., at 6.
83.  Police v. Roussety 2011 INT 130.
84.  Id., at 5 – 7.
85.  ICAC v. Roussety, supra note 17.
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people chosen by the accused, to appoint temporary employees.  Evidence showed that
the accused had threated the Island Chief Executive of the Rodrigues Regional
Assembly that if he did not appoint the said board, he would recommend to the Prime
Minister to dismiss him from his post.86
6.  ‘Trafic d'influence'—Section 10 creates different offences and section 10(4)
provides that:
Any person who solicits, accepts or obtains a gratification from any other person for
himself or for any other person in order to make use of his influence, real or fictitious,
to obtain any work, employment, contract or other benefit from a public body, shall
commit an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to penal servitude for a term not
exceeding 10 years.
The person referred to in section 10 who uses his influence does not have to be
a public official.  What matters is that the benefit is to be obtained from a public body. 
In ICAC v. Bumma,87 the accused, ‘a very influential political person who had contacts
at the Public Service Commission’,88 was prosecuted of soliciting a gratification from
the complainant to use his influence for her to be offered a teaching job by the Public
Service Commission.  He had allegedly promised to use his ‘political influence’ to that
end.89  A public body is defined in section 2 of the POCA to mean: ‘a Ministry or
Government department, a Commission set up under the Constitution or under the
authority of any other law, a local authority, or a statutory corporation; and (b) includes
a Government company.’
In ICAC v. Dauhoo Mohammad Iqbal,90 the accused was charged with
obtaining a gratification from one A for the Master and Registrar of the Supreme Court
for the cancellation of the sale of a plot.  The accused’s lawyer argued that the office
of the Master and Registrar of the Supreme Court was not a public body within the
meaning of section 2 of the Act.  The Court in acquitting the accused held that:
Can the court give a wide interpretation to public body to include the
office of the Master and Registrar in the present information?  The
legislator made the distinction within the POCA itself between the
86.  Id., at 4.
87.  ICAC v. Bumma 2010 INT 227.
88.  Id., at 2.  The accused was acquitted because of the inconsistencies in the state witnesses’
evidence.
89.  Id., at 4.
90.  ICAC v Dauhoo Mohammad Iqbal 2008 INT 267.
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corruption of a public official and a public body and took pains to
define it in the definition section.  True it is that one section is headed
“Bribery of public official” and the other “traffic d’influence”. 
However, we find that there is no ambiguity to resolve in the present
matter because the definitions are clear.  The definition of Master and
Registrar cannot be stretched to be brought within the definition of “a
public body” as the information [charge sheet] is presently worded.91
The Court concluded that:
The fact that the accused is alleged to have played an intermediary
role, has prevented the prosecution in the present case from making
full use of either section 5 or of section 10.  The fact that the POCA
does not cater for this particular scenario does not mean that the court
can substitute itself for the legislator.92
Therefore, the mere fact that a person is a public official does not mean that he works
for a public body.  However, it is also possible for the accused to be a public official
who is also working for a public body.93  In ICAC v. Gerard Phillippe Rayepa,94 the
accused, a police officer, was convicted under section 10(4) for soliciting a bribe from
one of the witnesses to help him obtain a driving licence.  He informed him that the
money was ‘for the “Boss” and others involved in the operation.’95  In his defence, he
argued that he had borrowed the money from the witness because he was ‘in financial
difficulty and used that money to pay his electricity bill.’96  In convicting the accused,
the court held, inter alia, that ‘the way the money was used is immaterial so long that
accused has taken it for himself.  An accused may chose to spent [sic] the money as he
so wishes and it may a mitigating factor but not an excuse.’97
91.  Id., at 4.
92.  Id.
93.  In ICAC v. Satyawan Kutwaroo & Anor, the Court observed that ‘Accused No.1 is a
draughtsman and Accused no.2 is an Inspector of Works.  Both are posted at the Pamplemousses and
Riviere du Rempart District Council.  The District Council is a public body and both accused are public
officials within the meaning of s. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2002.’  See ICAC v. Satyawan
Kutwaroo & Anor 2015 INT 24, at 1.  See also, Mungree v. The State & Ors 2013 SCJ 468, where the
district official allegedly solicited a gratification to remit to other district officials).
94.  ICAC v. Gerard Phillippe Rayepa 2011 INT 142.
95.  Id., at 2.
96.  Id., at 3.
97.  Id.
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In ICAC v. Dauhoo Mohammad Iqbal,98 the Court referred to section 10 of
POCA and held that ‘the word “benefit” is meant to be all encompassing.  It is not
possible to legislate or define all possible situations which may arise and we are of the
view that “benefit” should not be interpreted restrictively…’99
For the accused to be convicted under section 10, the prosecution must prove
the purpose for which the gratification was solicited otherwise the accused will be
acquitted.100  If the prosecution alleges that the accused obtained a gratification in order
to use his influence, it must prove that there was such remittance to the accused
otherwise the accused will be acquitted.101  The identity or existence of the person at the
public body to whom the gratification was to be remitted must also be proved if the
accused is to be convicted.102  In Mungree v. The State & Ors103 in which the accused
was prosecuted for soliciting a gratification for another person, the Supreme Court in
allowing his appeal held ‘that the evidence on record fell short of establishing to the
required standard of proof who was or were to be the recipient(s) of the gratification
solicited by the accused.’104  Proving the existence of such recipients is in line with the
accused’s right to a fair trial to be informed in detail of the charge against him.105
7.  Public official taking gratification—Section 11 provides for the offence of
a public official taking gratification.  It is to the effect that: Any public official who
accepts or receives a gratification, for himself or for any other person—(a) for doing or
having done an act which he alleges, or induces any person to believe, he is empowered
to do in the exercise of his functions or duties, although as a fact such act does not form
part of his functions or duties; or (b) for abstaining from doing or having abstained from
doing an act which he alleges, or induces any person to believe, he is empowered not
to do or bound to do in the ordinary course of his function or duty, although as a fact
such act does not form part of his functions or duties, shall commit an offence and shall,
on conviction, be liable to penal servitude for a term not exceeding 10 years.
Section 11 deals with a situation where a public official does or induces another
person to believe that he is empowered to do something ‘although as a fact such act
98.  ICAC v. Dauhoo Mohammad Iqbal, supra note 90.
99.  Id., at 5.
100.  ICAC v. Mohungur 2014 INT 114; ICAC v. Satyawan Kutwaroo & Anor, supra note 93.
101.  Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Buddoo 2012 INT 176, at 3.
102.  Id., at 4.
103.  Mungree v. The State & Ors, supra note 93.
104.  Id., at 7.
105.  Id., at 9.
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does not form part of his functions or duties.’  In ICAC v. Hamtohul Balakrishna,106 the
accused, a police sergeant, was prosecuted under section 11 for receiving for himself
a certain amount of money from a member of the public by inducing him to believe that
he could cause him ‘to secure a provisional driving licence whereas in truth and in fact
this was not the case.’107  The prosecution proved that the accused ‘was not employed
at the licensing section, the sole body responsible for issuing competent driving
licence.’108  The Court, on the basis of the accused’s admission that he had received the
money from the state witnesses, although as loans, and the state witnesses’ evidence
that the money had been for the accused to secure them driving licences, convicted him
accordingly.
8.  Conflict of interests—Section 13 provides for the offence of conflict of
interests as follows:
(1) Where (a) a public body in which a public official is a member, director or
employee proposes to deal with a company, partnership or other undertaking in which
that public official or a relative or associate of his has a direct or indirect interest; and
(b) that public official and/or his relative or associate hold more than 10 per cent of the
total issued share capital or of the total equity participation in such company,
partnership or other undertaking, that public official shall forthwith disclose, in writing,
to that public body the nature of such interest.
(2) Where a public official or a relative or associate of his has a personal interest in a
decision which a public body is to take, that public official shall not vote or take part
in any proceedings of that public body relating to such decision.
(3) Any public official who contravenes subsection (1) or (2) shall commit an offence
and shall, on conviction, be liable to penal servitude for a term not exceeding 10 years.
Apart from POCA, the Local Government Act creates the offence of conflict
of interest.109 However, unlike POCA which empowers the court to impose a sentence
of up to 10 years’ imprisonment on an offender convicted of conflict of interests, the
Local Government Act provides for a fine and imprisonment not exceeding two years. 
In ICAC v. Chetanand Pursun & Ors,110 the accused were prosecuted under section 13
of POCA instead of section 99 of the Local Government Act and they argued that this
was an abuse of process.  The Court in dismissing their applications held that the DPP
106.  ICAC v. Hamtohul Balakrishna, supra note 26.
107.  Id., at 1.
108.  Id., at 9.
109.  Section 99.
110.  ICAC v. Chetanand Pursun & Ors 2010 INT 104.
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had the discretion to determine under which law to prosecute the accused.
In ICAC v. Naushad Maudarbaccus and anor,111 the accused were prosecuted
under section 13 for conflict of interest in that ‘whilst being public officials, they took
part in the proceedings of a public body whilst their relatives had a personal interest in
a decision of the public body.’112  Accused number one chaired an ad hoc committee
meeting of the Tobacco Board at which his wife’s application for a tobacco growing
licence was considered and approved.  Accused number two was charged with having
taken part in the said meeting at which his wife’s application for a tobacco growing
licence was approved.113  Evidence was led to show that:
The Committee noted that some of the applicants were related to
certain members and/or employees of the Board.  The Committee held
the view that the Board should take the policy decision as to whether
employees of the Tobacco Board and/or close relatives might hold
permits to grow tobacco.  The Committee recommended to the Board
that all applicants be granted a license and to take a policy decision in
case of related parties. Accused no 3 was asked to leave the Committee
before the application was discussed being given that there was
conflict of interest as his wife was one of the applicants and he did
so.114  
Accused number one ‘admitted that one of the applicants was his wife and that the
recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee was not binding upon the Board.’115  All the
accused argued that all the board members were aware of the fact that their relatives had
applied for the licences and that they had declared their conflict of interest.116  In
convicting the accused, the Court observed that:
The fundamental principle remains that any proceeding before any
Board has to be conducted in a fair and just manner and has to be
perceived to be fair and just by any onlooker.  The fact that accused no
1 was the Chairman of the Board and accused nos 2 and 3 were
111.  ICAC v. Naushad Maudarbaccus & Anor 2010 INT 197.
112.  Id., at 1.
113.  Id.
114.  Id., at 3.
115.  Id., at 3 – 4.
116.  Id., at 4 – 5.
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members of the Board and they remained on the Board when the
recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee in relation to the
applications of their relatives were being tabled and ratified before the
Board cannot be perceived to be manifestly just and fair in as much as
they might have affected the tenor of the debates by their mere
presence.117
The Court concluded that ‘it would not be unreasonable, from the vantage point of the
fair-minded and informed observer, to come to the conclusion that a real possibility of
bias remained in the proceedings before the Board by the mere presence of the accused
parties.’118 
However, in ICAC v. Beegoo Kunal,119 the accused was present during a
committee meeting at which the issue of the renewal of his father’s contract to work for
a public body, at which the accused was employed in a senior position, was discussed
and did not disclose that the applicant was his father although ‘everyone [on the
committee] knew that the accused was the son of’ the applicant.120  However, the
minutes of the meeting show that ‘the accused did not talk at all nor did he intervene
in that decision. In fact he stayed mute when the decision for the renewal of the contract
of his father was taken.’121  All the committee members knew that the accused was the
applicant’s son but he ‘was not formally asked to momentarily leave the meetings when
the decision regarding [his father’s contract] was discussed and taken.’122 In acquitting
the accused, the court held that he had not taken part in the proceedings of the meeting
because ‘[t]he word “take part” should certainly be construed as the accused taking an
active part in the decision of the committees as opposed to his mere presence the more
so that he did not even opened [sic] his mouth during that particular deliberation.’123
The above cases show that it is not enough for the accused to declare his
conflict of interest, in addition to declaring his conflict of interest, he must also not take
part in a meeting at which his relative’s application will be considered.  The accused
also does not have to declare his conflict of interests if everyone knows that there is
such conflict as long as he does not participate in the deliberations dealing with the
issue in which he has an interest.  
117.  Id., at 7 – 8.
118.  Id., at 9.
119.  ICAC v. Beegoo Kunal 2009 INT 166.
120.  Id., at 2.
121.  Id., at 3.
122.  Id., at 3.
123.  Id., at 4.
2015]                                         Strengthening Democracy in Mauritius                                               303
In ICAC v. Jandoo,124 the accused was prosecuted under section 13 because
‘whilst being a member of the Board of the Information and Communications
Technology Authority (ICTA) he took part in the proceedings as regards the sale of
car…when he was interested in obtaining the car for his personal use.’125  Bids were
submitted for the cars and the accused knew two of the bidders, a fact he did not
disclose because he was not related to them.126  He had helped one of the bidders to
prepare the bid documents which helped her to win the bid.  However, the accused had
given money to one of the bidders to disguise as the buyer although the accused was the
real buyer.  When the car was sold, it was the accused that paid for its insurance and
drove it.  It was against that background the he was convicted of conflict of interest.
If an accused is prosecuted under section 13(1) for taking part in the
proceedings of a public body at which a decision is taken to benefit his relative, the
charge sheet must include the word ‘relative’ and not ‘relation.’  In ICAC v. Moossun,127
the court held that the use of the word ‘relation’ instead of ‘relative’ in the charge sheet
in the prosecution of the accused under section 13(1) meant that the accused was
prosecuted for an offence that did not exist and the court ordered the stay of the
accused’s prosecution.  The Court also held that he could not be retried as this would
amount to an abuse of process as the Supreme Court had held that the accused had been
tried for an offence that did not exist.128
9.  Corruption of agent—Section 16 provides that:
(1) Any agent who, without the consent of his principal, solicits, accepts or obtains
from any other person for himself or for any other person, a gratification for doing or
abstaining from doing an act in the execution of his functions or duties or in relation to
his principal’s affairs or business, or for having done or abstained from doing such act,
shall commit an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to penal servitude for a term
not exceeding 10 years.
(2) Any person who gives or agrees to give or offers, a gratification to an agent for
doing or abstaining from doing an act in the execution of his functions or duties or in
relation to his principal's affairs or business or for having done or abstained from doing
such act, shall commit an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to penal servitude
124.  ICAC v Jandoo 2013 INT 95.
125.  Id., at 1 and 2.
126.  Id., at 4.
127.  ICAC v. Moossun 2014 INT 225.
128.  For the Supreme Court reasoning, see Moossun v. The Independent Commission Against
Corruption 2013 SCJ 70.
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for a term not exceeding 10 years.
Section 16(1) deals with an agent who solicits, accepts, obtains a gratification
and section 16(2) deals with the person who gives, agrees to give or offers a
gratification to an agent.  In ICAC v. Boutanive,129 the accused, a freelance jockey, was
prosecuted under section 16(1) for having been paid for riding horses without his
principal’s consent.  The Court observed that the prosecution had to prove the following
elements for the offence under section 16(1): ‘an agent; without the consent of
principal; accept a gratification; for having done an act; in relation to his principal’s
business.’130  The Court found that ‘there was no contract of employment between the
stable and the accused but merely a gentleman’s agreement’ and that a senior member
from the stable gave evidence that the accused was a freelance jockey who ‘could ride
for whomsoever he wished.’131
The Court also found that there was no evidence that the accused had been paid
the said commission without the stable’s consent.  It is against that background that the
accused was acquitted.  It is therefore important that for a person to be convicted under
section 16(1), there is clear evidence that he was an agent for the principal and that one
of the ways to prove that is to show that there is a contract of employment between the
two.
As mentioned above, in ICAC v. Boutanive,132 the Court held that the offence
in section 16(1) has five ingredients.  However, in ICAC v. Nauzeer,133 the Court held
that the offence under section 16(1) has seven essential ingredients: an agent of his
principal; without the consent of his principal; solicits, accepts or obtain; from another
person; a gratification; for himself or for any other person; for doing or abstaining from
doing an act in the execution of his functions or duties, or for having done or abstained
from doing such an act.134 In ICAC v. Nauzeer,135 the accused, a security guard, was
prosecuted for obtaining a gratification to recommend the complainants to his employer
to employ them as security guards.  The Court held that: ‘the seven ingredient of the
present offence may be committed in two ways, namely for doing an act in the
execution of his duties or for having done an act in the execution of his duties.’136  After
highlighting how courts have interpreted some of the sections creating offences in
129.  ICAC v. Boutanive 2012 INT 240.
130.  Id., at 3.
131.  Id., at 4.
132.  ICAC, supra note 129.
133.  ICAC v. Nauzeer 2013 INT 110.
134.  Id., at 1 – 2.
135.  ICAC, supra note 133.
136.  Id., at 4.
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POCA, it is now imperative to have a look at the jurisprudence in which courts have
interpreted the sections relating to the issue of reporting corruption.
10.  Reporting corruption—Both public officials and non-public officials are
empowered to report corruption.  In most of the cases discussed in this article, members
of the public reported public officials who allegedly committed corrupt activities to the
Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC).  There are also cases where
public officials have reported fellow public officials to the ICAC.137  Section 48
imposes an obligation on the ICAC to keep as confidential the identity of the person
who has reported an act of corruption to it.  It provides for what is known as the
‘informer’s privilege’ in the law of evidence.
Under section 49, a person who discloses to the ICAC information that an act
of corruption has been committed by another person is immune from civil and criminal
liability resulting from that disclosure.138  It has been held that section 49 ‘shields those
persons who disclose information to the ICAC from civil or criminal liability as a result
of such disclosure in order to assist the ICAC in its investigation.’139  However, section
49(6) provides that ‘[a] person who makes a false disclosure under subsection (1) or (2)
knowing it to be false shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable
to pay a fine...and to imprisonment not exceeding one year.’ The purpose of section
49(6) is to prevent false disclosures.
In P v. Gobin Hemraz,140 the accused was convicted of making a false
disclosure to ICAC.  It should be noted that for a person to qualify for the immunity
under section 49(6), he has to make the disclosure to the officials mentioned in section
49(1) and (2). If the person disclosing an act of corruption is not a public official, he has
to disclose it to a member of the ICAC Board or an officer of ICAC.  If he is a public
official, he has to make the disclosure to ‘his responsible officer or to the Director-
General.’
In ICAC v. Chaundee,141 the court dealt with the issue of whether a member of
the public who had disclosed an act of corruption to a police officer instead of
137.  See for example, Police v. Ramchurn Shri Krishnaduth Jee, supra note 23 (where the
General Manager of Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool Corporation reported to ICAC that one of his
employees had used the Corporation’s tractor to plough people’s land and take the money); ICAC v. Suresh
Mahadeo, supra note 7 (where the Board of the  Rose Belle Sugar Estate reported the accused, the General
Manager of the Estate, to ICAC for soliciting a gratification contrary to section 4(1)(b)).
138.  See Parayag v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption, supra note 56, at 12.
139.  Oshi v. Municipal Council of Quatre Bornes 2015 INT 86, at 3.
140.  P v. Gobin Hemraz 2013 PL2 10.
141.  ICAC v. Chaundee 2012 INT 88.
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disclosing it to the ICAC officer was immune from prosecution in terms of section 49. 
The accused was prosecuted for bribery of a public official contrary to section 5(1)(b)
of ICAC. He had reported to a police station an act of corruption that had been
allegedly committed by another police officer.  After the necessary investigations, the
police referred the matter to ICAC which found that the accused’s allegations were false
hence the prosecution.  His lawyer argued that his prosecution was an abuse of the
process of the court because it was the accused who had reported the alleged act of
corruption to the police.  The prosecution argued that had the accused reported the
allegation to ICAC, section 49 would have been applicable.142  The Court held that
because of the fact that the police reported the allegation to ICAC three days after the
accused had reported it to the police, the accused had ‘indirectly’ reported that
allegation to ICAC because ‘had the Accused not reported or disclosed the alleged act
of corruption to the Police …, such an act would never have been disclosed to ICAC
as well.’143  The Court added that:
It is obvious that a very narrow literal reading of section 49(1) of the
Act would be in line with the submissions of the Prosecution in this
case as the disclosure was made in the first instance to the Police
authorities and not directly to the ICAC so that the Accused may not
benefit the immunity.  However, it is also undisputed that after the
matter was referred to ICAC…, the Accused reiterated his allegation
of the act of corruption against [the police officer] to ICAC
officers…who recorded same in presence of a senior investigator of
the Commission…  Thus, this time there can be no doubt that the
Accused directly disclosed the alleged act of corruption to two officers
of the Commission and falls squarely within the four corners of section
49 of the Act.144
It is against that background that the Court held that it would be an abuse of its process
to prosecute the accused under section 5(1).  However, it concluded that there was no
dispute that ‘the Accused might have made up a false allegation against the Police
Officer and therefore bearing potentially all elements of an offence under section 49(6)
of the Act.’145 This case highlights the fact that there may be a need to amend POCA
142.  Id., at 7.
143.  Id., at 8.
144.  Id., at 8 – 9.
145.  Id., at 9.
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so that members of the public can report allegations of corruption to other law
enforcement officers in addition to those who work at ICAC.  This now takes us to the
jurisprudence on the issue investigating corruption.
11.  Investigating corruption—Section 46 provides that: 
(1) Where…the Commission becomes aware that a corruption offence or a money
laundering offence may have been committed, it shall…refer the matter to the Director
of the Corruption Investigation Division who shall forthwith make a preliminary
investigation of the matter. (b) The Director of the Corruption Investigation Division
shall, within 21 days of a referral under paragraph (a) or within such other period as the
Commission may direct, report to the Commission on the matter.
(3) Upon receipt of a report under subsection (1)(b) or 2, the Commission shall - (a)
proceed with further investigations; or (b) discontinue the investigation.
Section 47 provides that: 
(1) Where the Commission proceeds with any further investigation under section 46(3),
the investigation shall be carried out under the responsibility of the Director-General.
(3) In carrying out an investigation under this section, the Commission may conduct
such hearings as it considers appropriate...
The fact that ICAC decides not to investigate a case of alleged corruption does
not mean that it is not in the public interest for such a case to be pursued by another
statutory body.146  One of the questions that the Court had to decide in ICAC v.
Anderson Ross & Ors147 was whether the ICAC was obliged to conduct a hearing under
section 47(3).  The defendants argued that:
[W]henever there is a suspicion that an act of corruption or money
laundering offence has been committed, there is a need to follow an
established statutory procedure as set out under section 46 of the
POCA, as a result of which a preliminary investigation should be the
starting point consistent with section 46(1)(a) of POCA.  The
Commission would then have two options upon completion of the
preliminary investigation which are spelt out under section 46(3) of the
POCA, namely a discontinuance of the investigation or proceed with
further investigation…[S]hould there be further investigation, the
Commission would have no other options but to proceed by way of a
hearing as per the statutory procedure set out under section 47 of
146.  Intralot (Mtius) Ltd v. Gambling Regulatory Authority & Ors 2009 SCJ 90, at 4.
147.  ICAC v. Anderson Ross & Ors 2014 INT 35.
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POCA and more particularly under section 47(3) of POCA…  He
submitted that adherence to this statutory procedure was mandatory
despite the fact that section 47(3) of POCA reads ‘…may conduct such
hearings as it considers appropriate…’ and such a hearing is even
more essential when the offence being investigated is one of money
laundering.148
In dismissing the application, the Court held that in Mauritian law, the word ‘shall’ has
to be interpreted to be imposing a mandatory requirement and the word ‘may’ gives the
decision maker the discretion to decide whether or not to take a particular action.149  The
Court concluded that:
[W]hen section 47 of POCA is read in its proper context and in line
with the intention of the Legislator, the only clear mandatory
requirement is that such further investigations are to be carried out
under the responsibility of the Director General or by delegated powers
to the Director of Investigations or any of his officers…  As regards
the requirement to conduct a hearing during the further investigation,
I find that the legislator has not made it a mandatory requirement.  A
close reading of section 47(3) of POCA shows clearly that the
Legislator has left discretion as to how to conduct the investigation and
permitted the use of hearing amongst others. The word ‘may’
expressly used by the Legislator gives the Commission the power to
also adopt any other mode of investigative process.150
In the author’s opinion, the Court’s interpretation of the relationship between sections
46 and 47 is correct.  Another issue that the Court dealt with was whether ICAC’s
application to the banks to disclose confidential information about their clients which
information ICAC needed in its investigation of money laundering allegations was not
against the bank’s duty to keep its client’s information confidential.  The Court referred
to section 51 of POCA, to the relevant provisions of the Banking Act and to the relevant
case law on the banker’s duty of confidentiality and held that that duty is not absolute
and that a banker was required to disclose such information to ICAC if it was
148.  Id., at 3 – 4.  Emphasis in original.
149.  Id., at 5.
150.  Id.  See also, Independent Commission Against Corruption v. NG Sui Wa Dick Christopher
2014 INT 16, at 5.
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investigating corruption and money laundering allegations provided that ICAC makes
an application to a judge in chambers for the judge to order the bank to disclose that
information.151  Therefore, in Mauritius, bank secrecy cannot be invoked to prevent the
ICAC from investigating corruption.  This is the case although the Supreme Court held
in Drouin & Ors v. Bank of Baroda152 that ‘[t]he rock-bed of a sound financial system
is banker’s confidentiality.’153
This holding is in line with Mauritius’ international human rights obligation.154 
However, for a court to order a bank to disclose confidential information to ICAC,
ICAC has to demonstrate that the situation requires the Court to make such an order. 
In The Independent Commission Against Corruption,155 in which ICAC made an ex
parte application for the Court to compel the Bank of Mauritius to disclose information
relating to the services rendered to its clients, guidelines issued to commercial banks
to combat money laundering, and other important documents, the Court held that it
could not make such an order as ICAC’s application appeared ‘more like a fishing
expedition than anything else.’156
In Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v. Independent Commission Against
Corruption,157 the Supreme Court held that ‘[t]he general rule is that confidentiality is
the very foundation of business, and more specially in the financial services sector’ but
that ‘[c]onfidentiality should…not be invoked to shield criminal activities which
undermine economic and political stability.’158
The relationship between sections 47 and 50 of POCA was dealt with in
Dowarkasing v. The Independent Commission against Corruption159 in which the
applicant argued that ‘following a preliminary investigation’ and, where it is felt that
a further investigation is needed, the law compels the ICAC ‘to resort to section 50 of
the POCA only’ and that ‘the provisions of section 47 go contrary to section 50 and to
151.  ICAC v. Anderson Ross & Ors, supra note 147, at 10 – 16.
152.  Drouin & Ors v. Bank of Baroda 2008 SCJ 304.
153.  Id., at 5.
154.  The UN Convention against Corruption requires states parties to ensure that bank secrecy
is not invoked to hinder corruption investigations and prosecutions.
155.  The Independent Commission against Corruption 2006 SCJ 02.  See also Independent
Commission Against Corruption 2006 SCJ 2; 2006 MR 52.
156.  The Independent Commission against Corruption 2006 SCJ 02, id., at 5.
157.  Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v Independent Commission Against Corruption 2005
SCJ 99; 2005 MR 223.
158.  Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v Independent Commission Against Corruption, id;
2005 MR 223, id., at 6.
159.  Dowarkasing v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption 2013 SCJ 138A.
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the spirit of the POCA and should have no application’ in such a situation.160  It should
be recalled that section 50(1) provides that:
Where the Commission decides to proceed with further investigations
under section 46 or 47, the Director-General may - (a) order any
person to attend before him for the purpose of being examined orally
in relation to any matter; (b) order any person to produce before him
any book, document, record or article; (c) order that information which
is stored in a computer, disc, cassette, or on microfilm, or preserved by
any mechanical or electronic device, be communicated in a form in
which it can be taken away and which is visible and legible; (d) by
written notice, order a person to furnish a statement in writing made on
oath or affirmation setting out all information which may be required
under the notice.
In dismissing the applicant’s application, the Supreme Court held that:
Under section 47, the respondent may decide to invite a person to
collaborate in its further investigation without any compulsive element
underlying the invitation.  A person who does not turn up for a hearing
in response to the invitation does not commit any offence.  If he does
turn up, he will commit an offence only if he makes a false or
misleading statement in the course of the hearing …  Section
50…covers a different situation which can be qualified as a post-
section 47 situation.  It is where a person fails to respond to a request
under section 47 that section 50 gathers its importance.  The
respondent is empowered under section 50(1) to direct a number of
orders to any person…  Non-compliance with any of the orders made
under section 50 is an offence punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding 5 years pursuant to section 50(6) of the Act.161
In ICAC v. Joymungul Ambar,162 the accused was suspected to have committed an act
of corruption and ICAC summoned him in terms of sections 50(1)(a) and (d) to answer
some questions.  He gave his statement after an oath had been administered to him by
160.  Id., at 3.
161.  Id., at 3.
162.  ICAC v. Joymungul Ambar 2009 INT 246.
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a senior official of the ICAC who was not present at all during the recording of the
statement.  The defence argued that the evidence obtained from the accused was
inadmissible because the procedure that was followed was irregular. In holding that the
evidence was admissible, the court concluded that:
The whole point of administering an oath is to give authenticity and
due weight to the statement which comes afterwards.  If the person
administering the oath was not present during the whole proceedings,
then he cannot vouch for the authenticity of whatever was said in his
absence.  However, the Commissioner who administers the oath under
section 50(1)(d) is not supposed to record the evidence himself and
transmit it to the authority concerned.163
The Court held that in the circumstances of the case, especially in the light of the fact
that the accused’s lawyer was present when he made the statement, the evidence was
admissible. Section 56(1) of POCA provides that:
Notwithstanding any other enactment, where a Judge in Chambers, on
an application by the Commission, is satisfied that the Commission has
reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed an offence
under this Act or the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money
Laundering Act 2002, he may make an attachment order under this
section.
Section 56(2) provides for the effects of an attachment order and section 57 provides
for the features of an attachment order.  Section 57(2) provides that ‘an attachment
order shall, unless revoked by a Judge in Chambers, remain in force for 60 days from
the date on which it is made.’  Section 57(3) provides for the circumstances in which
the duration of an attachment order may be extended.  In Fauzee Bros & Co. Ltd. & Ors
v. Independent Commission Against Corruption,164 the applicant applied to the Supreme
Court to rescind and/or vary an attachment order that had been issued by a judge in
Chambers pursuant to the respondent’s application.  In dismissing the application
because it had not been made before a judge in chambers, the Court held that ‘it is clear
163.  Id., at 2.  The accused’s appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed.  See Joymungul v. The
State & Anor 2014 SCJ 143.
164.  Fauzee Bros & Co. Ltd. & Ors v. Independent Commission Against Corruption 2008 SCJ
296.
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that the intention of the legislator is that the Judge in Chambers, on account of the
special features pertaining to the said jurisdiction ensuring expediency and
confidentiality, should be the pre-eminent jurisdiction to be seized for…attachment
orders’ and other orders under the Act.165
Likewise, in Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v. Independent Commission
against Corruption,166 the Supreme Court referred to section 56 and held that ‘an
application for such an attachment order by the Commission can only have any
significance if it is made to the Judge in Chambers and granted ex parte.’167  An
attachment order may be issued against any property which the ICAC reasonably
suspects to be proceeds of unlawful activity even if the funds or property in question
have originated from abroad.168  However, an attachment order cannot be served on a
person who is not in Mauritius.169  The Supreme Court has held that ‘section 56 does
not allow for an Attachment Order to be sought against a party who is a suspect in a
case or who has been charged.’170  POCA used to provide for temporary freezing orders
but the relevant sections were repealed in 2011.171
Another issue that courts have dealt with is whether a police officer who is
seconded to ICAC retains his powers as an ordinary police officer.  Section 24(5)(b) of
POCA provides that ‘the Commission may - for the purpose of this Act, make use of
the services of a police officer or other public officer designated for that purpose by the
Commissioner of Police or the Head of the Civil Service, as the case may be.’  Section
53(1) provides that:
Where the Director-General is satisfied that a person who may assist
him in his investigation - (a) is about to leave Mauritius; (b) has
interfered with a potential witness; or (c) intends to destroy
165.  Id., at 3.
166.  Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v. Independent Commission Against Corruption, supra
note 157; 2005 MR supra note 157.
167.  Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v. Independent Commission Against Corruption, id;
MR, id., at 2.
168.  The Independent Commission Against Corruption 2005 SCJ 72.
169.  Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v. Independent Commission Against Corruption, supra
note 157; 2005 MR,  supra note 157, at 4 – 5.
170.  Lesage v. ICAC 2003 SCJ 101; 2003 MR 204, at 15.  See also, Manraj & Ors v ICAC,
supra note 6; 2003 MR 41, at 16
171.  See Act 9 of 2011.  For a brief mention of the freezing orders under POCA, see DPP v.
A.C.A. Gaffoor 2010 SCJ 223, at 5; Air Mauritius v. Tirvengadum (Sir) 2005 SCJ 161, at 7; Technology
Soft Corporation & Ors v. Independent Commission Against Corruption, supra note 157; 2005 MR, supra
note 157; Peerkhan & Ors v. The State 2008 SCJ 110, at 10.
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documentary evidence which is in his possession and which he has
refused to give to the Commission, the Commission may, in writing,
direct an officer to arrest that person.
Section 53(2) provides for the procedure that has to be followed after arrest, the rights
of an arrested person and the circumstances in which the Commission may detain him. 
In Ha Yeung Chin Ying v. Independent Commission against Corruption & Anor,172 the
applicant argued that a police officer seconded to ICAC does not have the ordinary
powers of a police officer and that such an officer is not an officer of ICAC if he still
receives his orders from the Commissioner of Police.  The Supreme Court held that
when a police officer is seconded to the ICAC,
[H]e remains a Police Officer within the meaning of the Police Act and
retains all his functions under that Act, including his powers,
immunities, liabilities and responsibilities under the common law or
under any other enactment.  Among such powers are notably his
powers of arrest, detention and of lodging provisional information.173
The Court added that ‘there is nothing abnormal’ about the fact that a police officer
who is seconded to ICAC retains his powers as any police officer even if he is
appointed to a senior position in ICAC.  This is the case although there is ‘no doubt’
that such officer ‘is subject to the orders and directives issued to him by the
[Commissioner of Police] under section 6 of the Police Act but when posted to the
[ICAC] and …he is also amenable to the directives of the [ICAC].’174  The Court added
172.  Ha Yeung Chin Ying v. Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor 2003 SCJ
273; 2003 MR 228.
173.  Ha Yeung Chin Ying v Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor, id; 2003
MR, id., at 5 – 6.  See also, Peerthum v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) & Anor
2012 SCJ 371.  However, see also Lesage v. ICAC, supra note 170; 2003 MR, supra note 170, at 15, where
the Court held that ‘The text of the law that enables a Police Officer to come to ICAC empowers him to
act as an Officer of ICAC and engage in the work of ICAC.  It does not empower a Police Officer to do
the work of the Commissioner of Police at ICAC in the name of ICAC.  This fatal confusion of role has
been caused by an absence of proper designation of statutory duties.’ 
174.  The Court observed that ‘It is noteworthy that the Legislator could also have achieved the
same purpose by specifying in the Act, as was done in Section 101B of the Independent Commission
Against Corruption Act 1988 of New South Wales, Australia, that police officers who are seconded for
duty at the Independent Commission Against Corruption retain all their powers, immunities, liabilities and
responsibilities attached to their office.’  See Ha Yeung Chin Ying v. Independent Commission Against
Corruption & Anor, supra note 172; 2003 MR, supra note 172, at 8.
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that there was no need for POCA to expressly provide that police officers seconded to
ICAC retain all their powers as police officers.175  The Court concluded that the
secondment of police officials to ICAC is crucial in empowering ICAC to fight
corruption and fraud.176
The Privy Council also reached a similar conclusion in another matter.177  A
senior prosecutor may travel with investigators to a foreign country to advise them
when they are in the process of gathering evidence that will be used at the accused’s
trial in Mauritius even if the accused is to be prosecuted by that same prosecutor.178
Although the accused has a right to summon witnesses, his application to summon that
prosecutor as a witness in chief to give evidence about the lawfulness of the
investigations that were carried out abroad will be dismissed if it is meant to abuse the
court process.179  A public official may disclose confidential documents to ICAC if
those documents are needed in the investigation of corruption and once those
documents are disclosed to ICAC, even if the application to ICAC was not made in
terms of section 52 of POCA, they are admissible in evidence.180  Under part three of
this article above, we have dealt with some of the offences under POCA.  It is now
necessary to have a look at the general principles relevant to prosecution of corruption
that have emerged from Mauritian courts.
B.  Prosecuting corruption
POCA criminalises different conducts and a person could be prosecuted for the same
conduct under different sections.  In ICAC v. Soobrun,181the Supreme Court held that:
POCA seeks to criminalize as many situations of bribery as may be
possible and creates a host of offences.  In many cases, the offences so
175.  Ha Yeung Chin Ying v. Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor, id; 2003
MR, id.
176.  Ha Yeung Chin Ying v. Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor, id; 2003
MR, id., at 9.  See also, Ha Yeung Chin Ying v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor
2003 SCJ 64; 2003 MR 36 in which the judge held that a police officer seconded to ICAC may lawfully
arrest a suspect.
177.  Peerthum v. Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor [2014] UKPC 42.  This
was an appeal to the Privy Council after the Supreme Court granted the appellant the leave to appeal.  See
Peerthum v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor 2013 SCJ 138.
178.  Ahmine v. Chady & Anor 2013 SCJ 264.
179.  Id., at 10.
180.  ICAC v. Pursun & 2 Ors 2014 INT 218.
181.  ICAC v. Soobrun, supra note 39.
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created overlap not only with others in POCA itself but also with
criminal offences under the Criminal Code.  They are, however, not
mutually exclusive.  Which charge befits which offender in which
situation is not for the courts to decide but for the prosecution in its
discretion.182
For example, a person may be prosecuted for the same conduct either under section 4(1)
or under section 7 and the prosecution will remain valid.  In Burhoo v. The Independent
Commission Against Corruption & Anor,183 the appellant was prosecuted and convicted
of using his position as a public official for gratification contrary to sections 7(1) and
83 of POCA.  He argued that he was wrongly charged under section 7(1) ‘when the
circumstances of this case fall squarely under Section 4(1) of the Act.’184  In dismissing
the appeal, the Supreme Court held that: ‘[t]he fact that the appellant could, in the
circumstances of the present case, have been equally charged under Section 4 of the
Act, does not mean that the charge laid against him under Section 7, was defective.’185 
The Court added that the prosecution had the discretion to determine which section to
invoke in prosecuting the accused.186
Section 82(1) of POCA provides that ‘…no prosecution for an offence under
this Act…shall be instituted except by, or with the consent of, the Director of Public
Prosecutions.’ Subsections 2 and 3 empower officers of the ICAC to also prosecute
offences under the Act. Therefore, in terms of section 82, the general rule is that the
offences under the Act have to be prosecuted by the Director of Public Prosecutions or
by another person with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.  Subsections
2 and 3 provide for the exceptions.  All the cases discussed in the article have been
prosecuted either by the ICAC or by the police.  In Suneechara v. The State,187 one of
the issues was whether ICAC’s acting Chief Legal Adviser could legally institute
proceedings against an accused under section 4(1)(a) of POCA.  The Supreme Court
held that:
182.  Id., at 5.  See also, Joomeer v. State, supra note 8, para 50; Parayag v. The Independent
Commission Against Corruption, supra note 56, at 15.
183.  Burhoo v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor 2012 SCJ 211. 
184.  Id., at 4.
185.  Id.
186.  Id., at 5.  See also, ICAC v. Subhiraj Dookhy and Anor 2013 INT 38 in which the same
approach has been taken.
187.  Suneechara v. The State, supra note 37.
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There is no doubt that pursuant to section 82 of the POCA, the ICAC,
in its own rights, has the authority to initiate criminal proceedings and
conduct prosecution in respect of any offence under the Act.  Although
section 82(1) requires that a prosecution shall not be instituted for an
offence under the Act without the consent of the DPP, one can hardly
suggest that any prosecution undertaken by ICAC becomes that of the
DPP.  Under our legal system, an aggrieved party other than the DPP
may legitimately institute and undertake criminal proceedings before
a Court of law.  This explains that informations [charge sheets] are
lodged by local authorities or Ministries whenever there have been
breaches, for example, of licensing, health or building regulations. 
This also explains the possibility of a private individual lodging a
private prosecution provided he is an aggrieved party…  All
prosecutions initiated by a party other than the DPP are however
subject to the DPP’s decision to take over and continue or to
discontinue such criminal proceedings as set down in section 72 of the
Constitution.188
The Court also added that the mere fact that a public prosecutor had prosecuted the case
on behalf of the ICAC did not mean ‘that the DPP had taken over the conduct of the
criminal proceedings so that it became the aggrieved party to the exclusion of the
ICAC.’189  This case shows that there may be a need for the law to be amended to
specify, in clear terms, the circumstances in which public prosecutors and ICAC
officials may co-prosecute the accused in such a manner that there is no ambiguity as
to which of the two institutions is actually in charge of the prosecution.  As the Court
observes, the appellant’s lawyer had a valid point when he submitted that the fact that
the case was prosecuted by a public prosecutor ‘could have misled the appellant into
believing that the DPP had exercised his power to take over the prosecution pursuant
to section 72(3)(b) of the Constitution.’190  In ICAC v. Jacques Roger Rousseau and
Ors191 the Court held that ICAC is an integral part of the state and therefore cannot be
categorised as ‘person other than the state’ for the purpose of section 4(1) of the Public
Officers Protection Act which provides that such a person’s right to institute criminal
proceedings against another person expires after two years.
188.  Id., at 7.
189.  Id., at 7 – 8.
190.  Id., at 10.
191.  ICAC v. Jacques Roger Rousseau & Ors, supra note 18.
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Should the offender be prosecuted by the ICAC with the consent of the DPP
and he appeals against his conviction or sentence, he must cite the DPP as one of the
respondents.  In Sicharam v. Independent Commission against Corruption,192 the
appellant was prosecuted by the ICAC with the consent of the DPP and convicted of
influencing a public official to make a decision favourable to the accused and sentenced
to three months’ imprisonment.  In his appeal against the conviction, he only cited the
ICAC as the respondent.  In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court referred to its
earlier jurisprudence and held that:
We take the view that the proposition of law to be drawn from [the
cases cited] is that, in an appeal against conviction following a
prosecution by a party other than the Director of Public Prosecutions,
the appellant has to join the Director of Public Prosecutions either by
himself or through the State as a party to the appeal.  However, in the
case of an appeal against an acquittal following a prosecution by a
person other than the Director of Public Prosecutions, the latter ought
not to be joined as a respondent to the appeal, but notice of appeal may
be given to him at any time before the hearing of the appeal.  The
requirement of joinder or notification is important if the Director of
Public Prosecutions is to be in a position to meaningfully exercise his
powers under section 72 of the Constitution.193
As mentioned earlier, there are many cases in which the police have prosecuted people
who have committed offences under POCA.  The question that the Supreme Court has
had to deal with is whether POCA empowers the police to institute charges against
people accused of corruption.  In Ramkalawon v. State,194 the appellant was prosecuted
by the police and convicted of taking a gratification to screen an offender from
punishment in breach of section 6(1)(b) of POCA.  In his appeal against conviction, he
argued, inter alia, that the Commissioner of Police did not have the power to assume the
duties of the ICAC.195  The point of contention was whether section 45(2) of POCA
permitted the Police to prosecute offences under POCA. Section 45(2) provides that:
192.  Sicharam v. Independent Commission Against Corruption 2011 SCJ 375.
193.  Id., at 2.
194.  Ramkalawon v. State 2012 SCJ 254.
195.  Id., para 14
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Where in the course of a Police enquiry - (a) it is suspected that an act
of corruption or a money laundering offence has been committed; and
(b) the Commissioner of Police is of the opinion that the matter ought
to be investigated by the Commission, the Commissioner of Police
may notwithstanding the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money
Laundering Act 2002 and subject to subsection (3) refer the matter to
the Commission for investigation.
In dismissing his appeal, the Supreme Court held that:
There would have been purchase in the argument of learned counsel
for the appellant had POCA provided that ICAC has exclusive
competence to investigate offences created under the Act.  ICAC,
albeit an independent and impartial body, with its own staff, its own
parliamentary accountability, its own budget and its own statutory
rules for the conduct of an enquiry is not a legal system outside our
legal system.  In no way does it curtail the power of any other person
or body to investigate and prosecute an offence.  ICAC is no more than
a specialized body with proficiency in dealing with sophisticated
offences of corruption and money laundering in their multiple forms. 
For all its independence and impartiality, it is still an integral part of
our legal system and may only operate within the framework of our
constitution.  In this sense, ICAC is not the only specialized body
which has been created by an Act of Parliament to deal with
specialized and sophisticated areas of the law where the authority is
entrusted with statutory responsibilities of conducting investigation
and prosecution.196
The Court added that interpreting the law to exclusively empower the ICAC to
investigate and prosecute corruption ‘would be to stretch ICAC’s powers beyond the
permissible limits of the law.’197  It should be noted that it is not POCA only which
criminalises corruption.  The Criminal Code, for example, criminalises the taking of
bribes198 as does POCA.  A prosecutor has a choice either to prosecute the offender
196.  Id., para 18.
197.  Id., para 19.
198.  See section 126(1)(b).
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under the Criminal Code or under POCA.199  It is not one of the requirements in POCA
that for a police officer to arrest a person who is suspected of having committed one of
the offences under the Act, he/she should have participated in that person’s
interrogation relating to the alleged corrupt activities.  What matters is that the police
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect committed one of the offences
under POCA.200  A suspect must be informed of his rights, such as the rights to remain
silent, not to incriminate himself, and to have his lawyer present during the
interrogation otherwise he may successfully challenge the admissibility of such
evidence.201
Where a public official is accused of accepting a bribe, he will be convicted
even if he chewed and swallowed the notes in question, provided that there is
circumstantial evidence to prove that he accepted the bribe.202  ICAC is not obliged to
furnish the accused with a preliminary investigation report compiled under section 46
of POCA unless failure to furnish such a report will negatively affect the accused’s
right to a fair trial.203
Section 81 of POCA imposes an obligation of confidentiality on all officials
and board members of ICAC.  It provides, inter alia, that:
(2) No member of the Board or officer shall, except in accordance with
this Act, or as otherwise authorised by law - (a) divulge any
information obtained in the exercise of a power, or in the performance
of a duty, under this Act; (b) divulge the source of such information or
the identity of any informer or the maker, writer or issuer of a report
given to the Director of the Corruption Investigation Division.  (3)
Every Member of the Board and every officer shall maintain
confidentiality and secrecy of any matter, document, report and other
information relating to the administration of this Act that becomes
known to him, or comes in his possession or under his control.
In Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) v. Ramdoyal & Anor,204 the
first respondent sued the second respondent for damages for malicious denunciation in
199.  Rambhurosh v. The State 2009 SCJ 218.
200.  Police v. Jugnauth Pravind Kumar, supra note 19.
201.  Id.
202.  Police v. Kiran Kumar Burhoo, supra note 20.
203.  Chady v. Her Honour, Mrs. R. Seetohul-Toolsee, Senior Magistrate, Intermediate Court
& Anor 2011 SCJ 54; ICAC v. Chetanand Pursun & Ors, supra note 110.
204.  Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) v. Ramdoyal & Anor 2010 SCJ 156.
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writing in the sense that the second respondent gave false and malicious information
ICAC which led to the prosecution of the first respondent in a case that was dismissed
by a lower court.  In order to strengthen his case, the first respondent asked the lower
court to order ICAC to bring and produce to him certified copies of all the documents
and statements that the second respondent had submitted and made to ICAC about the
first respondent.  ICAC invoked section 81 and argued that it had a duty to keep that
information confidential.205  The Supreme Court held that ‘the obligation of
confidentiality imposed on the members of the board of the Commission and on the
officers of the Commission is not absolute but is subject to exceptions “in accordance
with the Act, or as otherwise authorised by law”.’206  The Court then concluded that:
Accordingly, the imperative of affording to an accused party a fair trial
is one of the instances where under section 81(2) of the Act, the
disclosure of relevant investigative material should be considered as
“authorised by law”.  Similarly where public interest requires that
material which is otherwise confidential, be disclosed to ensure a fair
trial in civil proceedings, such disclosure will necessarily be
considered as “authorised by law”, for the purposes of section 81(2).
The Court ordered ICAC to comply with the summonses issued by the lower court and
produce the documents in question because they were ‘necessary to ensure a full and
fair trial of the civil action before the’ lower court.207
1.  Sentences imposed for corruption—POCA prescribes sentences ranging
from six months to 10 years for those convicted of different offences.208  However, the
prescribed sentence for most of the offences is that not exceeding 10 years’
imprisonment.  In other words, courts have the discretion to decide which sentence to
impose on the offender provided that the sentence does not exceed 10 years’
imprisonment.  Jurisprudence from courts in Mauritius shows that courts have imposed
the following sentences on those convicted of offences under POCA: three months’
205.  Id., at 2.
206.  Id., at 3.  Emphasis in the original.
207.  Id., at 4.  However, in Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Ramdoyal & Anor
2011 SCJ 44, the full bench of the Supreme Court held that the judge had erred in ruling on the issue of
admissibility of evidence obtained on the basis of section 81.  That this issue should be left for a trial court.
208.  For 10 years, see sections 4(1), 5(1), 7(1), 8(1) and (2), 9, 10, 11, 12, 13(3), 14, 15, 16; for
six months, one year and five years, see section 6(1).
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imprisonment for influencing a public official contrary to section 9,209 for accepting a
bribe in breach of section 4(1)(b),210 for soliciting from another person, for himself, a
gratification for doing an act in the execution of his duties contrary to section 4(1)(a)
and (2),211 and for accepting for himself a gratification contrary to section 4(1)(a).212 
Five months’ imprisonment for using his office for gratification;213 six months’
imprisonment for accepting a bribe as a public official contrary to section 4(1)(a),214 for
using his position for gratification contrary to section 7(1),215 and for bribery by a public
official contrary to section 4(1)(e).216  Nine months’ imprisonment for taking a
gratification to screen offender from punishment contrary to section 6(1)(b);217 twelve
months’ imprisonment for accepting a bribe contrary to section 126(1)(b) of the
Criminal Code218 and for soliciting a bribe contrary to section 4(1)(a) of POCA.219  The
Supreme Court held that the circumstances of the case will determine the sentence the
court will impose on the offender.220  The Supreme Court also held that the magistrate
was correct not to impose the sentence of community service on the offender convicted
of corruption because of ‘the gravity of the offence and the position of the offender.’221 
It is clear that in most of the cases courts have imposed sentences of less than
a year in prison although the maximum sentence is 10 years’ imprisonment.  It is argued
that although corruption is a serious offence, not all offenders are the same and not all
offences are committed under the similar circumstances.  It is better that courts are
given the discretion to determine which sentence to impose on the offender depending
on factors such as the offender’s personal circumstances, the seriousness of the offences
and the interests of society. POCA does not provide for sentences that may be imposed
209.  Sicharam v. Independent Commission Against Corruption, supra note 192.
210.  Bissessur v. The State & Anor, supra note 62.
211.  Curpen v. Independent Commission against Corruption & Anor, supra note 35.  The
accused was a police official and solicited a bribe so as to investigate a case against the suspect such that
he would not be prosecuted.
212.  Suneechara v. The State, supra note 37.
213.  Joomeer v. State, supra note 8.
214.  Hanumunthadu Rajen v. The State & Anor, supra note 32.
215.  Burhoo v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor, supra note 183.  See
also, Noormamode v. ICAC & Anor, supra note 7 (marriage officer falsifying birth dates hence facilitating
child marriage).
216.  Parayag v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption, supra note 56, at 1.
217.  Ramkalawon v. State, supra note 194, para 1.
218.  Rambhurosh v. The State, supra note 199.
219.  Joymungul v. The State & Anor, supra note 163.
220.  Hanumunthadu Rajen v. The State & Anor, supra note 32, at 18.
221.  Joomeer v. State, supra note 8, para 54.
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on corporate bodies found guilty of corruption.  The court recommended in Police v.
Boskalis International bv and anor,222 there may be a need for POCA to be amended
to address this lacuna.
2.  Some of the challenges faced in prosecuting corruption—Prosecuting
corruption has not been a very smooth process.  There have been cases where the
prosecutors have not been able to secure convictions although there was evidence that
an offence was committed.  However, the mere fact that there is evidence of corruption
does not mean that the accused will be convicted.  The accused can only be convicted
if the prosecution adduces evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused
committed the offence.  Factors which have led to the acquittal of those accused of
corruption include: the witness’s failure to lead evidence to convince court that he
identified the accused as the person who solicited the bribe from him,223 the main
prosecutor’s witness’s refusal to come to court and testify,224 and the inconsistencies in
the main state witness’s evidence.225
The inconsistencies in state witnesses’ evidence have been largely attributed
to the fact that many years pass by between the time the witness reports the case to
ICAC and the time the accused is prosecuted.  For example, in some cases it had taken
three years,226 four years,227 six years,228  or nine years,229 for the accused to be
prosecuted since the case was reported to the ICAC and statements taken from the
witnesses. 
Sometimes those who commit corrupt activities in their countries of nationality
do not keep the proceeds of their unlawfully activities in those countries.  They, for
example, keep the money in foreign bank accounts or buy property in foreign countries. 
Mauritius has mechanisms in place to ensure that those who commit corruption in
Mauritius and keep the proceeds of their corrupt activities outside the country do not
222.  Police v. Boskalis International bv & Anor, supra note 64, at 15.
223.  Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Kaundun 2008 INT 10.
224.  Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Luchooa & Anor 2007 INT 240;
Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Balluck, supra note 59.
225.  Police v. Venkatakistnen Rangasananda, supra note 20; Police v. Veeria Hasokumar, supra
note 21; Curpen v. Independent Commission Against Corruption & Anor, supra note 35.
226.  Police v. Soobarao Rama, supra note 20, at 2.
227.  ICAC v. Baboolall, supra note 24, at 4.
228.  Police v. Veeria Hasokumar, supra note 21, at 5 (the accused was acquitted of the offence
of bribery of a public official because of the inconsistencies in the main state witness’s evidence); ICAC
v. Gowry Suraj, supra note 20 (prosecuted for assisting a prisoner to escape from lawful custody); ICAC
v. Joymungul Ambar, supra note 162, at 1; ICAC v. Bumma, supra note 87, at 6.
229.  ICAC v. Satyawan Kutwaroo & Anor, supra note 93, at 3.
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escape justice.  However, in practice it has been difficult to obtain evidence of abroad.
In Police v. Chady Mohummud Siddick,230 the accused was provisionally
charged with receiving a gift for corrupt purposes. In order to secure a conviction, the
prosecution needed evidence from the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Singapore
where the accused had allegedly hid the proceeds of his criminal activities.  However,
despite the fact that the prosecution did all that it could to obtain evidence from these
countries, there was a delay of several months in securing that evidence which resulted
into the magistrate striking the case off the roll.  However, the accused’s application to
travel abroad was dismissed as the court was of the view that ‘[t]his case bears an
international ramification and is a complex one’ and that ‘[t]here is a risk that if there
is no condition imposed on the Accused restricting his freedom of movement in and out
of Mauritius, he may try to interfere with witnesses and tamper with evidence.’231
In Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v. Independent Commission against
Corruption,232 the applicant was suspected of money laundering and some of the
evidence needed to prosecute the case had to be obtained from abroad.  However, the
foreign authorities delayed to tender that evidence to ICAC and the court, in revoking
the freezing order against the applicants’ property, held that the ‘institutional
inadequacies which result in the applicants’ assets remaining frozen for an unreasonably
long period cannot be condoned.’233
The ICAC has also been sued sometimes successfully234 and sometimes
unsuccessfully235 for terminating the employment contracts of some of its senior
officials.  Some ICAC officials have flouted fundamental procedural issues such as
230.  Police v. Mohummud Siddick Chady 2011 PL3 18.  The accused’s earlier applications for
the case to be struck off the role because of the delay in prosecuting him had been dismissed.  See Police
v. Mohummud Siddick Chady 2010 PL3 66; Police v. Chady Mohummud Siddick 2008 PL3 149.
231.  Police v. Chady Mohummud Siddick 2012 BRC 126, at 2.
232 Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v. Independent Commission Against Corruption, supra
note 157; 2005 MR, supra note 157.
233.  Technology Soft Corporation & Ors v Independent Commission Against Corruption, id;
2005 MR, id., at 7.
234.  Bhadain v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption 2004 SCJ 182; Bhadain v.
The Independent Commission Against Corruption 2004 SCJ 183; Bhadain v. ICAC 2005 SCJ 132; 2005
MR 272.  The Court held that the dismissal of the three applicants, the Director of the Corruption
Investigation Division, the Chief Investigator and an investigator, was unlawful.
235.  Dabee-Bunjun v. Independent Commission Against Corruption 2010 SCJ 266 (ICAC’s
refusal to renew its Chief Legal Adviser’s contract was not unlawful).  In Dabee-Bunjun v. Independent
Commission against Corruption 2011 SCJ 23, the application to appeal to the Privy Council was
dismissed.  Bisasur v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption 2014 SCJ 189 (for terminating
Deputy Commissioner of ICAC’s contract of employment).  In Taujoo v. The State & Anor 2013 SCJ 332,
the former Deputy Commissioner’s position was phased out by an amendment to POCA.
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improperly conducting the identification parade236 leading to the acquittal of the
accused.  In one case, the device that ICAC officials gave to a complainant to record the
conversation with the accused did not function properly and the recording was
unintelligible.237
III.  CONCLUSION
Although most of the accused have not been high profile public officials, there have
been a few exceptions where senior public officials have been prosecuted under POCA. 
These have included a vice Prime Minister and Minister of Finance who was prosecuted
for conflict of interest,238 Chairman of the Mauritius Ports Authority,239 and the
Assistant Commissioner of Police.240  The prosecution of senior public officials for
corruption could to be attributed to, inter alia, the fact that there is no political influence
in the decisions that ICAC makes.  ICAC also receives the funds it needs to conduct its
operations.  And it would appear that it incurs a lot of expenses in the process and that
the money comes from the national budget as opposed to donors.  This is because the
Supreme Court observed that ICAC ‘is a publicly funded institution, drawing for its
heavy expenses, on the pockets of the citizens of this country.’241
One of the issues that have consistently emerged during the investigations of
corrupt activities relates to the use of traps or undercover operations.  Some of the
accused were arrested after a trap had been set by the ICAC officials.  In some cases,
the accused have raised the issue of whether evidence obtained through entrapment is
admissible.  For example, in Police v. Kiran Kumar Burhoo242 where ICAC officials
instructed the complainant how to take a bribe to the accused and when the accused
received the money from the complainant he was arrested by the ICAC officials.  The
accused’s lawyer argued that:
That this was a case of ‘entrapment or a shameful operation’ and that
entrapment was condemned by law…  [T]he sting operation was
planned as ICAC officers were keen to obtain results and the
prosecution was based on entrapment.  All the details of the sting
236.  ICAC v. Doyal, supra note 28, at 6.
237.  Police v. Charlot, supra note 69.
238.  Police v. Jugnauth Pravind Kumar, supra note 19.
239.  Ahmine v. Chady & Anor, supra note 178.
240.  Independent Commission Against Corruption v. Suneechara Oozageer 2006 INT 190.
241.  Bhadain v. ICAC, supra note 234; 2005 MR, supra note 234, at 20.
242.  Police v. Kiran Kumar Burhoo, supra note 20.
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operation were given to the complainant.  Everything was done to trap
the accused.243
The Court held that:
Indeed entrapment is one method by which executive agents of the
state misuse the coercive law enforcement functions of the courts and
thereby oppress citizens of the state.  Entrapment occurs where agents
of the state, mostly police officers, lure or incite or entice or instigate
citizens into committing acts forbidden by the law and then seek to
prosecute them for doing so.  Was the prosecution here founded on
entrapment?  In this Court’s view, far from it.  We note here that by
the time of the much-decried sting operation, the complainant had
already reported an actual incident of a public official soliciting of a
bribe from him.  True it was the completion of the offence took place
after the ICAC became involved.  However, it was a fact that the
completion would have occurred with or without such involvement.244
It appears that had the court found that there had been entrapment, it would have held
that the evidence in question was inadmissible and the accused would have been
acquitted.  In Parayag v. The Independent Commission against Corruption,245 the
appellant argued that he had been arrested because of a trap set by ICAC officials and
therefore the evidence of his involvement in the alleged corrupt activities should have
been excluded.  In dismissing his appeal, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that:
We are satisfied that the commission of the offence by the appellant
has not been brought about by the ‘state’s own agents’.  The appellant
already had the intent to commit the crime and the police officers had
no role to play in the formation of his intent.  The present case is
certainly not one where the police officers themselves lured the
appellant into committing an act forbidden by the law and then
prosecuted him for doing so.  There is absolutely no evidence on
record showing that the officers enticed the appellant to commit an
243.  Id., at 7.
244.  Id., at 7.
245.  Parayag v. The Independent Commission Against Corruption, supra note 56.
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offence he would not otherwise have committed.246
In the light of the fact that some corrupt activities may not easily be investigated unless
traps or undercover operations are used, there may be a need for the legislature in
Mauritius to address the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained through
entrapment. Some countries in Africa, such as South Africa,247 have legislative
provisions which govern the admissibility of evidence obtained through traps or
undercover operations.
246.  Id., at 9.
247.  See section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977.
